A change of leadership is an opportunity for an organization to review its values and objectives and, perhaps, set a new course for itself. As World War II was drawing to a close in 1945, the Royal Society was faced with such an opportunity, having to select not only a new President in succession to Henry Dale but also two new Officers. Many within and beyond the Society were keenly interested in the outcome. Almost 20% of the Fellowship, spurred on by Percy Andrade, signed a petition setting out for the benefit of Council where the Society should be heading and the attributes that the incoming President would need to lead it there. The petitioners’ vision proved somewhat controversial, but more controversial was their action in seeking to influence Council directly rather than leaving things to take their normal discreet course. In the end they won the argument but lost the battle. The episode is revealing of the Society’s values and culture at the time.

Keywords: 1945 presidential election; E. N. da C. Andrade; Henry Dale; Henry Tizard; Robert Robinson; G. I. Taylor

SETTING THE SCENE

The choosing of a new leader is often a stimulus for an organization to consider what it really cares about. If this occurs at a time of major change in the organization’s external context, there is added urgency to the process. And if some of the organization’s members are determined to stir things up, a revealing debate about identity and core values is almost guaranteed.

The Royal Society found itself in such a situation at the beginning of 1945. Responsibility for the Society’s affairs is vested in a Council of 21 members, five of whom hold particular offices and devote a very considerable portion of their time—voluntarily—to the Society. Three of these five were due to stand down at the end of 1945: the President (Henry Dale), the Biological Secretary (A. V. Hill) and the Foreign Secretary (Henry Tizard). This threatened a major discontinuity in the Society’s leadership. A year ahead of the event, that prospect was giving rise to much discussion.
The discussion took place in an unprecedented context for science and for society. As the war in Europe was reaching its climax, it was obvious that the position of science in public life had changed dramatically and that its new status would need to be consolidated in peacetime. But the growth of science and, especially, the growth in public spending on science brought with them the spectre of increased government control of science. The Royal Society as an organization had mostly kept a low profile in the vigorous prewar debates about planning in science and about how to maximize the social benefits of science, although individual Fellows featured prominently on all sides of the debates.2 The growing prominence of these issues therefore presented the Society with something of a challenge.

The Society’s leadership had direct experience of its limitations in trying to influence the shaping of science policy under wartime conditions. The Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) to the War Cabinet3 had exposed the Society to the frustrations of the political process and the paradoxes of its own position—the pinnacle of UK science, closely connected to the elite of the British Establishment, yet independent of partisan interest and not part of the inner circle of national policy-making. In the early days of the war it had taken the Society three attempts even to get SAC created, against opposition from Churchill’s adviser Lindemann, who was contemptuous of it, and from senior Treasury officials, who did not want their influence diluted. They tolerated it essentially as a sop ‘to keep the scientific people quiet’. Once created, it was poorly resourced and was given peripheral tasks to occupy its time. Dale later complained that it was in danger of ‘dying of malnutrition’,4 and Tizard told Dale that SAC ‘just exists in order to delude Parliament and the public—nothing more.’5 In terms of providing a platform for Royal Society influence on public policy, there was less to the Scientific Advisory Committee than met the eye.

Beyond the exceptional circumstances of wartime, though, the Society had to consider its role in the new context that would exist for science after the war. The trigger for a serious discussion about this was a letter from the physicists Ralph Fowler and Patrick Blackett to the Officers in October 1943. They were worried about how fundamental physics would fare in a postwar world that they expected to prioritize the applications of science. This could not, in their view, be left to chance and local initiative: it needed organized advocacy if the necessary resources were to be secured, and organized oversight if the extra resources were to be used well.

In response to the letter, the Society set up a series of committees to examine not only physics but also seven other areas of science. The ensuing report, colloquially known as the Postwar needs report and circulated in January 1945, concluded that academic scientific research would need to expand so much in future that it could no longer rely on private benefactions or the block grants allocated by the University Grants Committee but, in the national interest, would require major direct inputs of public money.6 The report also argued for a central role for the Society in advising the Treasury on how such money should be spent, and for substantial increases in the funds given to the Society itself for expansion of its existing programmes in support of scientific investigations, travel grants and publication grants. Blackett wanted the Society to push more strongly to become the body that controlled and administered the financial provisions for research, but it would not go that far.7 The Society’s balancing act on this point was highlighted at a meeting of Fellows in May 1945 to discuss the Postwar needs report. Here A. V. Hill, like Blackett, argued that the Society was the most appropriate body for ‘guiding and stimulating the healthy and balanced development of scientific enquiry taken as a whole’. The Fellows agreed, but thought that healthy and balanced development would be
achieved naturally if each university always chose the most distinguished leaders for its posts: central planning was unnecessary provided there was sufficient support for the less fashionable areas of research.8

This debate was not a purely private matter. The radical pioneer science journalist J. G. Crowther speculated in *New Statesman* in December 1944 how the Society might respond to wartime developments and peacetime opportunities:

What relation is the Society to have to these new and immense scientific activities, many of them conducted and financed by Government? Is it to have a directive function?... Hasn’t the policy of the last hundred years [of becoming an increasingly specialized scientific body] unfitted the Society for the role of statesmanship? If so, shouldn’t the Society reform itself again on the original Baconian lines, rather like the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with definite official status, resources and powers?9

Crowther was worried that, if the Society did not get involved, there might be a separation of scientific authority (resting with the Society) and administrative responsibility (resting with government): ‘these huge administrative machines will grow without ideas and possibilities of their own, repulsive to men of intelligence, and finally without brain or soul.’ However, he resignedly concluded that the Society, the ‘custodian of scientific quality’, would probably stay clear of planning and seek the more modest path of ‘fostering and encouraging, with the sustainment of quality’.9

Against that background of change and jockeying for position at national level, the future of the Royal Society leadership was a matter of public interest. But, by long custom, the debate within the Society about who should succeed Henry Dale was tightly controlled. The formal process was that, towards the end of the Society’s year, the current Council would determine a slate of 11 existing members of Council and 10 new members,10 and, among those 21, the individuals recommended for appointment to the five Officer posts; this slate would be put to such Fellows as were able personally to attend a formal meeting at the Society on Anniversary Day, 30 November; and the newly elected or re-elected Council and Officers would take up their posts at the end of that day. Quiet discussions about potential nominees would of course start rather earlier, not least to allow time to ensure that those identified were in practice willing to take up their various intended roles.

This degree of control rankled with quite a few Fellows. In 1935, 92 Fellows animated by Frederick Soddy petitioned Council: to shorten the terms served by each Officer; to allow for Council members to be elected by postal ballot, and from a list of names greater than the number of vacancies; and the Officers then to be chosen by the incoming rather than the outgoing Council. These proposals were rejected by the then Council, and by the Fellowship as a whole. The demand for greater democracy in the Society’s affairs, and, associated with that, for greater public engagement by the Society bore some modest fruit in the following years,11 but not enough to ward off all pressure for reform. It just needed a Fellow determined to stir things up.

**THE ANDRADE ‘MEMORIAL’**

The physicist Edward Neville da Costa Andrade, known to his friends as Percy, was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society a month after Soddy’s 1935 petition was submitted to Council.
He served two years on Council, finishing in November 1944, and during that time played an influential part in shaping Council’s response to the Fowler–Blackett letter. He was deeply opposed to Crowther’s suggestion that the Royal Society might emulate the Soviet Academy’s central role in the national planning of science, but short of that he was keen to see the Society contribute strongly to the development of science policy.

Andrade was also a man of strong personal likes and dislikes. From his vantage point on Council he caught the early whispers about possible candidates to succeed Henry Dale as President at the end of 1945. He did not like what he heard. Undeterred by Soddy’s experience, he decided to draft a petition to Council and to collect signatures in support of an alternative approach. While on Council he had heard ‘frequent regrets that Fellows did not more frequently let Council know what they are thinking’; he decided to take Council at its word.

As a member of Council, Andrade could hardly organize a petition aimed at himself. But he quietly drafted a ‘memorial, or what you will’ in October 1944, and discussed the concept with a few trusted colleagues in the Society, including his fellow physicists Patrick Blackett and Henry Tizard. Tizard was then serving as Foreign Secretary and Blackett was about to go back onto Council. Once he had completed his term on Council at the end of November, Andrade stepped up the pace. He worked a bit more on the text and then started approaching his friends and contacts to collect signatures. By mid January 1945, 10 Fellows had signed the memorial; by 19 February, 50 Fellows had signed; and by the time Andrade finally sent in the memorial on 19 March, 84 Fellows had signed it.

This was all done by personal contact, with a strong emphasis on confidentiality. The aim, however, was not to catch the Society’s core leadership off its guard: the byword was discretion rather than secrecy. Andrade kept the Officers informed, taking care to do so in such a way that they did not have to respond officially before the memorial was formally submitted. So, for example, in addition to consulting Tizard, he discussed the memorial at length with the Biological Secretary, A. V. Hill, ‘as a wise friend and not as an official of the Royal Society’, and he reported to his close friend Charles Sherrington that Hill ‘considers our action a perfectly proper and constitutional one, welcomes it, and thinks we are doing the Society a service. … If A. V. Hill thinks that all is well I do not think there can be much wrong.’ He also informed John Griffith Davies, the head of the Society’s staff. Sherrington had been President from 1920 to 1925, and his early decision to sign was a major fillip for Andrade because it unequivocally legitimized the initiative. He could tell potential signatories; ‘There is, of course, nothing irregular or Bolshevik in the Fellows memorialising Council.’

One of the factors spurring Andrade on was his wish to see the Society actively engaged in public life. This, he felt, would be thwarted if the wrong person succeeded Dale: ‘The whole future of the Society is at stake, and if we appoint an ornamental or quarrelsome President the Society will lapse into being a purely honorific body.’ He wanted an organization to speak for British science as a whole, and worried that the Society could fall short if it made the wrong choice: ‘The Royal Society completely missed the boat at the beginning of the war and I am afraid that unless we have an energetic and courageous President, who has experience of how to get things done, we shall do the same at the end of the war.’ Sydney Chapman agreed: ‘There is much need for the Royal Society to awaken to the social and national relations of science, and to bestir itself in these matters, just as the British Association has in recent years, to much good effect.’ Dudley Newitt commented more darkly: ‘I have had the impression during recent years that there have
been influences at work in political circles which have tended to deprive the Society of its rightful place in national affairs; and there could be no better time than the present to deliver a counter-attack.\textsuperscript{19} To those concerned about politicization, Andrade stressed, ‘None of us wants to see the Royal Society a political body although we do want to see it speak for science when the politicians want advice.’\textsuperscript{20}

So Andrade’s memorial argued that the Society should ‘assume its just place as the voice of British science and exercise that guiding influence on the scientific aspect of our national wellbeing which was contemplated by our founders.’ Such status seemed then to be slipping from its grasp. The Society had earlier played a key role in the nation’s scientific machinery, but now ‘its real influence in national matters would seem to be decreasing rather than increasing.’ In international relations, too, ‘the prestige of the Society has not increased in recent years.’ These trends had to be reversed, or else it would be left, precariously, to ‘the various government departments and government-controlled corporations, and to other scientific and professional scientific bodies, to advise our rulers; to see that science, in particular academic science, is justly treated.’ The memorial took heart, though, from the \textit{Postwar needs} report, which showed that the Society had ‘clearly realised its national responsibility in the matter of scientific research.’\textsuperscript{21}

However, and ironically in view of later developments, when discussing the matter with potential signatories the example that Andrade quoted most often of a policy issue needing vigorous attention from a new, politically sophisticated and politically engaged President was the Society’s need for better headquarters. This was indeed a big talking point within the Society at the time, and for another 20 years. But it seems a touch parochial in view of the high-flown rhetoric of the debate!\textsuperscript{22}

It is unlikely that Andrade’s initiative was motivated primarily by a wish to secure a better home for the Royal Society. As with the \textit{Postwar needs} initiative, Andrade was focused on ensuring that the Society would share his ambitions for impact at national level, exercising a guiding influence on science policy while avoiding the trap of centralized planning. He was also keen that the Society should not allow itself to be outmanoeuvred on the international stage by the British Council, which he saw as trying to usurp the Society’s natural position as ‘the voice of British science abroad’.\textsuperscript{23} But Andrade seems to have been motivated, too, by personal reactions to the individuals being mooted as potential Presidents.

The memorial spelt out in considerable detail the attributes required of the President if the Society were indeed to be the voice of British science and exercise a guiding influence on the nation’s scientific affairs. He should have a knowledge of the machinery of government and of government procedure, and not stand in undue awe of the leading figures in government and administrative circles; he should be accustomed to presenting the case for science, or for particular aspects of science, to political ears; and he should have considerable international experience. He should also, of course, be energetic, sufficiently young in spirit to handle opposition and apathy, a good speaker and of high academic status.

But could such a paragon to be found? And if not, would it be appropriate, as the memorial then proposed, in the exceptional circumstances prevailing in 1945 and without necessarily setting a precedent, to settle for an individual whose scientific achievements were of just below Copley Medal\textsuperscript{24} status in order to secure the other attributes? Such a break with custom was not lightly to be entertained. Although Andrade was careful in selecting those he approached to support his memorial, one-third of them refused to sign it, nearly all because they feared that the Society’s prestige would suffer if the President were not demonstrably in the very top rank of acknowledged scientific achievement. The
argument about exceptional circumstances proved two-edged: if a President thus elected proved successful it would be all the easier for the practice to become embedded. Besides, ‘The times truly are critical, but I cannot remember any time when they were not.’

The memorial was not an abstract reflection on theoretical possibilities. There was a real choice to be made and there were real individuals in the frame. That is why so much effort went into it. The two names being floated most prominently at the outset were the organic chemist Robert Robinson and the physicist G. I. Taylor—both men of great personal scientific distinction devoted to their work and most unlikely to be sympathetic to Andrade’s activist agenda. Andrade dismissed them together: ‘Neither of them is a good speaker, neither of them is particularly a man of affairs, and neither of them would, I feel, give sufficient attention to the affairs of the Society’—adding, unconvincingly, ‘I have not a grain of personal feeling against Taylor or Robinson . . . I am thinking solely of the Society.’ For all his protestations to the contrary, Andrade’s campaign certainly had shades of being directed personally against Robinson, whom he repeatedly described to potential signatories as ‘temperamentally unfitted for this particular post’. Given Robinson’s scientific eminence and given that he had just become both a member of the Royal Society’s Council and one of the personally appointed Vice-Presidents, this needed some care.

Andrade needed to widen the field beyond Robinson and Taylor. His preferred choice for President was Henry Tizard. Tizard was a man with serious Whitehall experience, first as Secretary in the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and later as Chairman of the Air Defence Committee before and during the war. He had also been Rector of Imperial College. He had been elected to the Royal Society in 1926 and at the time of the memorial was starting the last year of a five-year term as Foreign Secretary; but, crucially, he had not been awarded any of the Society’s medals, let alone the Copley. What Andrade did not know was that Tizard was then hoping to reduce his involvement in Society affairs, not increase it. In response to the problem of three Officers retiring together, he had even offered to resign immediately, in January 1945, so that his successor could start a year early.

The first draft of the memorial, which Andrade sent Tizard on 28 October 1944, was too subtly phrased for Tizard to realize its full import. The draft also confused some of those approached for signatures. Part of Andrade’s intention in generating the memorial was to send a message to Council that Tizard commanded considerable support among the Fellowship as a potential President and should therefore be considered seriously—lack of Copley Medal notwithstanding. So in early February he amended the text to say just that, explicitly and controversially mentioning Tizard by name. Tizard was horrified, and said so to Andrade. Andrade tried to soothe him, extolling the virtues of those who had so far signed and stressing:

There is a big job to be done if the Royal Society is to take its rightful place. . . . The memorial is designed to convince you that you are called on to do the job, to strengthen the hands of your supporters on Council, and to answer any on Council who may say ‘It will find no support among the Fellows.’

Tizard’s response was to offer to remain neutral but to demand that Andrade not involve him in any future discussions on the matter.

Early on in the process Sherrington warned Andrade that the memorial must not be seen as an attack on the current Officers, the Council or, above all, the President Henry Dale. He
must not ‘hold a pistol to the Royal Society or its present Council’.\textsuperscript{30} The final version of the memorial was therefore strikingly deferential, praising the existing regime and concluding:

> We hope that it will be clear to Council that our action is dictated solely by a wish to aid, and not to embarrass, Council in the extremely difficult task which it has before it, and that we shall loyally accept whatever decision Council may make in this critical matter.

Privately, however, Andrade was a great deal less complimentary about the Royal Society hierarchy. As rumours swept to and fro at the end of February, he tried to set up a meeting with Albert Chibnall, one of his supporters, to discuss ‘some very queer developments which make our action all the more necessary’. Chibnall, for his part, had heard of developments that he thought would make a present of the Presidency to G. I. Taylor. A few days later, unable to fix a time for an immediate meeting, Andrade confided his own, different, rumour in a letter:

> I think that the prefects are going to try to put in AVH. By a manoeuvre that I will describe to you when we meet they have practically arranged that he shall succeed Dale at the RI [Royal Institution], where Dale is to have two more years. . . . I think that it is time that we begun priming the members of Council. Are there any whom you could approach, eg Peters? I do not think that the prefects will stop at anything. There is a lot more that I could say if we could only meet. Please destroy this letter.\textsuperscript{31}

**THE PREFECTS TAKE ACTION**

Percy Andrade’s memorial was formally circulated to Council on 4 April 1945, and at that point Council finally had to do something. The ‘prefects’—that is, the Officers, whom Andrade in his darker moments seemed to regard as a hostile, controlling force—had of course not sat idly waiting for the memorial to arrive. They were as divided as any other group of Fellows about the relative merits of the various potential candidates and about whether scientific excellence should be the overwhelming criterion in selection of the next President. There was certainly no preferred ‘Establishment’ candidate at that stage, despite Andrade’s broodings on the matter. But the Officers were united on the need to avoid personal embarrassment to individual members of Council and any repeat of the 1935 experience of a publicly contested—and publicly reported—presidential election.

The Physical Secretary Jack Egerton therefore had a private meeting with Andrade on 16 February—probably at Tizard’s request—and, or so he thought, persuaded him to drop explicit mention of Tizard from the memorial.\textsuperscript{32} However, when on 19 March Andrade sent in the memorial with its 84 signatures to the Officers before submitting it formally to Council, Tizard’s name was still there. Tizard objected strongly and told his fellow Officers that unless it was removed he would resign immediately from Council and withdraw his name from all further discussion of the Presidency. Andrade and the Biological Secretary, A. V. Hill, therefore drafted a letter to all the signatories to explain that persisting with Tizard’s name in the memorial would be self-defeating. The letter was sent out by the two Secretaries, the offending sentence was removed before the memorial reached Council, and overt embarrassment was avoided for the moment.\textsuperscript{33}

It was an instructive illustration of how the Society handled awkward internal disputes at that time. The initiative for dealing with the presidential succession rested with the five Officers in the first instance. Three of them were effectively parti pris: Henry Dale as the outgoing President and A. V. Hill and Henry Tizard as potential candidates to succeed
him. That left Jack Egerton and the Treasurer, Thomas Merton. Merton was based in Herefordshire and Egerton in London, so it largely fell to Egerton to manage the quiet diplomacy. Having had his meeting with Andrade, Egerton arranged for six members of Council to have an informal discussion at his flat on Thursday, 1 March. Before then, he and Hill had already established both that virtually all Presidents for many years had indeed had the Copley Medal and that the practice of selecting Presidents alternately from the physical and biological sciences dated only from 1915 and thus had ‘no real basis in the Society’s (even recent) history’. This allowed Hill to advocate the merits of his fellow physiologist Edgar Adrian, whom he thought a stronger potential President than, for example, Henry Tizard.

At the 1 March lunch, Egerton alerted the Council members to how, with the impending simultaneous retirement of three Officers, ‘the whole future of the administration of the RS is as it were in the melting pot.’ He argued the case for creating more flexibility by not automatically maintaining the physical/biological alternation. He briefed them in some detail on the Andrade memorial, and particularly on the question of whether ‘the highest scientific eminence in discovery and research’ should be the dominant criterion in selecting the new President or whether ‘experience, knowledge of affairs, drive and judgement are qualities needed at the helm at the present time’—suggesting that Hill, Adrian and a third physiologist, Joseph Barcroft (then aged 72 years), would meet both criteria. To provoke discussion he produced a list of ten presidential possibles: Edgar Adrian, Joseph Barcroft, G. H. Hardy, A. V. Hill, Lord Rayleigh, Robert Robinson, N. V. Sidgwick, G. I. Taylor, Henry Tizard and E. T. Whittaker. By the end of the meeting the feeling was that, on the criterion of scientific eminence, Taylor and Robinson were the leading candidates, with Adrian and Hill equally strong from the biological side. Council members also agreed to explore the possibility of creating a post of ‘Chairman of Committees’ separate from the Presidency. This would allow the selection of a President (such as G. I. Taylor) who was scientifically outstanding but was regarded as lacking ‘administrative acumen’: the Chairman of Committees would then handle those aspects of the post that did not naturally suit the President’s talents.

Egerton briefed Henry Dale in detail that Sunday on how the meeting had gone. Dale took the mainstream view that it would be preferable to maintain the physical/biological alternation with as scientifically strong a candidate as possible, and was wary of the idea of a separate Chairman of Committees. Egerton also briefed some Council members who had been unavailable on 1 March and convened a further meeting at his flat on 23 March. Tizard, who absented himself from these meetings, told Egerton that he favoured Taylor or, even better, Hill.

Egerton’s 23 March meeting, immediately after the Secretaries had ordered the removal of Tizard’s name from the memorial, noted that there were many reasons for keeping Tizard, with all his experience in dealing with government, on the slate of possible candidates even though it would be seen as a break with the traditional focus on scientific excellence. The meeting agreed, and ended with five names still in play: Adrian, Hill, Robinson, Taylor and Tizard.

There were other conversations going on between members of Council. The mathematician Bill Hodge, for example, told Blackett that he was worried about any possible departure from the criterion of scientific excellence, which had been a ‘tremendous asset’ to the Society: ‘The President’s main job, I consider, is to symbolize the Society’s devotion to fundamental science before every other consideration.’
however, strongly favoured rearranging the Society’s work so that more was delegated and less depended on the President’s own political and administrative skills. Blackett agreed that it could not all depend on finding a President who would be outstanding on all criteria. Much more responsibility had to be devolved to the Vice-Presidents, to a Chairman of Council or a General Purpose Committee, to the Sectional and other Committees, and to an enlarged and higher-calibre staff. Both Egerton and Hill endorsed these comments, though Egerton thought that the President should at least take the chair at Council meetings.41

Hodge also told Blackett that, given a choice between Robinson and Taylor, he preferred Taylor: ‘The more I see of Robinson, the more I get the idea that he has a considerable degree of cantankerousness in him.’42

Cantankerous, interfering and temperamentally unsuited to the post: as a potential President of the Royal Society, Robert Robinson had his flaws. And, for some, that was not all. The 51-year old Albert Chibnall explained to A. V. Hill that, ‘like most of the younger Fellows that signed’, his main motive for supporting the Andrade memorial was to stop Robinson becoming President—for a very particular reason: ‘He is a very great chemist but I think he would be a fatal choice—to the younger people, especially outside the RS, he represents ICI and big business.’43

Now Robinson’s family firm, Robinson & Sons Ltd, had started as a manufacturer of surgical dressings. His father sent him off to Manchester to study chemistry so that he could be of use to the business. It was natural to Robinson that he should combine a high-level academic career with strong industrial involvement, notably with the British Dyestuffs Corporation, ICI and, after his retirement from academe, Shell. He was eventually credited with 32 patents. Chibnall himself had received practical and financial support from ICI early in his research career and had subsequently worked closely with ICI on the development of a new fibre, staying on as a consultant until 1941 and acquiring three patents in the process.44 His suggestion that Robinson’s connections with ICI should disqualify him from the Royal Society Presidency is therefore curious, and not echoed in other surviving material bearing on the 1945 election. Maybe it reflected a view that the Society should keep its distance from big business rather than a hostility to applied science as such.

Council formally discussed the question of Henry Dale’s successor, and the memorial, for the first time at its meeting on 19 April 1945—though naturally not a word about this appeared in the minutes. A. V. Hill, Robert Robinson and Henry Tizard were all present. Hill later wrote a private account of the meeting, recalling that many Fellows thought Tizard would make an admirable President on account of the enormous services he had rendered before and during the war and his wide-ranging acquaintance with leading personalities both in science and in public life. But Tizard, along with ‘a good many
other Fellows’, was still deeply irritated by the memorial and refused to have his name discussed at the meeting. Robert Robinson then proposed Hill. Hill did not want to get mixed up in ‘this unpleasant business’: ‘there was nothing I longed for so much as to get back to my scientific work.’ So he, too, said that did not want to be considered. Then, as Hill tartly put it in his private memoir, ‘Robinson’s name was mentioned and he tactfully expressed his doubts.’ No further progress was made.

That evening Robinson phoned Dale to reinforce the comments he had made at Council. Born in September 1886 (the same month as A. V. Hill), he did not want to spend the next five years on official duties, having already lost so much research time because of the war. He thought that Hill, being based in London rather than Oxford, could take on the Presidency at lower opportunity cost. Hill, complaining that he had done no research for six years, did not see it quite the same way. The Presidency seemed to both of them more threat than opportunity.

Tizard’s supporters on Council were not prepared to let his cause rest. Blackett began to favour him over Taylor (and either of them over Robinson), and said so to both Egerton and Hodge. He thought that Tizard’s scientific achievements were at least the equal of Taylor and Robinson but simply less well known because of wartime secrecy, and that his impact in Whitehall was due to scientific judgement and originality rather than mere administrative ability. Hodge continued to rate Taylor above Tizard scientifically. Another Council member, David Pye, told Tizard that there would be ‘real and widespread regret’ were he finally to withdraw his name, and assured him that there would be ways of lightening the burdens of office.

When Tizard had first grasped that Andrade really was wanting to push him forward for the Presidency, he dismissed the idea as ‘ridiculous’. By early May, however, he was willing to concede privately to Dale:

I realise I must take seriously the mention of my name, and must not dismiss it as ridiculous. . . . these are strange times, which call for unusual decisions... although I realise my own shortcomings acutely it would be rather cowardly to decline to act if it were really the wish of the Society that I should do so.

But he was willing to do so only if he had the demonstrable backing of a large majority of Council. He emphatically was not prepared to take part in a contested election. Dale sympathized with Tizard’s position, as he sympathized with Hill’s and Robinson’s declared wish to get on with their research. But he was faced with the situation that the three apparently strongest candidates—all members of Council—had all stated their wish to withdraw from consideration. Vexed, he pleaded with Tizard not to absent himself from the next Officers and Council meetings on 17 May. He guessed that Council would not accept Tizard’s withdrawal.

Both Hill and Robinson formally withdrew from further consideration for the Presidency at the 17 May Council meeting, each of them sending in letters that Dale was obliged to read out loud to Council. But Council insisted on keeping Tizard, and Taylor, in the frame for the moment, as Dale had predicted. Dale himself was highly annoyed by the whole process, and wrote at length to Tizard to express his frustration and try to stop him finally pulling out. He saw Andrade’s memorial as a large part of the problem, telling Tizard:

It is almost incredible that this signature of a memorial by a few Fellows, most of them well-meaning and few, if any, deliberately mischievous, could have done so much
harm. . . . If those idiots had not meddled, we should long ago have settled our nomination, and . . . I believe you would have been chosen. He told Tizard that he had received complaints about this ‘attempted interference by a self-selected caucus’ from some Fellows who had refused to sign Andrade’s memorial, and that F. E. Smith had written formally to express ‘the objection of an unknown body of Fellows to the action of the memorialists’. Dale had had to read out Smith’s letter to Council as the price for Smith’s group not writing to the press about the issue. Any hope he may have had of keeping things in a low key at the 17 May meeting had, anyway, been thwarted by Robinson. Robinson’s formal letter of withdrawal had explicitly, and against Dale’s pleading, highlighted the memorial ‘because he wouldn’t be persuaded that the object of the memorialists was not to deprecate the choice of himself in particular’—in which he was, of course, in large measure correct. To compound Dale’s irritation with the memorial, he was then faced with Tizard wanting to withdraw because of ‘gossip’, interpreting it (also correctly) as advocacy for himself.

Once Hill and Robinson’s withdrawals had been discussed and accepted, the 17 May Council meeting turned to Tizard and Taylor. Tizard’s supporters made such a strong case for him that Dale was convinced a vote then would have handed him the nomination by a ‘very large majority’—and not necessarily ‘on account of such qualifications as the memorialists emphasised’. But no vote was taken because the case for Taylor had not yet been made, and the meeting had run out of time.51 The issue was formally left ‘in suspense’. The challenge for Dale then was to stop Tizard bolting before the next Council meeting, on 14 June. Sympathizing with Tizard over the ‘embarrassment of having your claims advocated by a bunch of interfering busybodies’, he begged him not to ‘let these tiresome incidental circumstances wreck the chance of the Council doing what they regard as the best for the Society.’

It fell on deaf ears. Tizard, even with the prospect of now securing the large Council majority that he set as a prerequisite, nevertheless hardened his attitude and responded to Dale’s letter with an ‘adamant’ refusal to be considered further. Dale told Hill dolefully, ‘We shall have to accept the situation. Never, in the long history of our Presidential elections, has so much mischief been caused for so many by so few.’52

Andrade’s memorial had thus caused three of the four strongest candidates to drop out, leaving only G. I. Taylor still in the running. Hill wrote sympathetically to Tizard:

I am very sorry indeed, because I had greatly hoped you would be President and said so to Council. But I . . . should certainly have done as you have done in the circumstances: indeed you may remark that I did it with much less provocation! . . . It is very sad. The more I see of politics the more I like science.53

But Hill was furious with Andrade and told him so.54 He also told Dale of a personal worry about the looming scenario in which he would be Foreign Secretary and based in London, and Taylor would be President, based in Cambridge and ‘anxious to avoid all the responsibilities he could’: Hill feared that he would end up doing most of the President’s work. ‘That isn’t why I’m giving up everything else to get back to my lab!’55

Dale briefed Council members on these developments, and when they met on 14 June they decided to let the matter rest a bit longer rather than going immediately for the one name still available. The critical Council meeting, then, would be 12 July. Egerton confided to his diary that he regarded Taylor as the leading general physicist in the
country: ‘his election to Presidency would be perfectly normal and therefore lead to no faction whatever; in fact, in my opinion, to general satisfaction. Charming personality.’ However, he also thought that Council should have a wider choice, or at least a fallback position, and on 11 July he suggested the chemist N. V. Sidgwick—who had signed the memorial—as an additional candidate. At 72 years of age he was 13 years older than Taylor but ‘experienced, much looked up to for mental power and knowledge, much respected abroad for his work and his intellect’. So that made it two names on the slate.

The Officers normally held a formal meeting on the morning of Council day and would then have a private lunch together (that is, without any staff or other Fellows present) ahead of the Council meeting in the afternoon. During their lunch on 12 July, they realized that having a chemist other than Robinson as President might create problems, especially as Robinson was already Vice-President. So they raised the matter with Robinson, and, at the last possible moment, he retracted his withdrawal. So Dale was able to present Council with a slate of three candidates for the Presidency.

That afternoon Council dealt initially with the Foreign Secretaryship, which A. V. Hill agreed to take on for a year in succession to Tizard, and with the Biological Secretaryship, for which E. J. Salisbury was selected. Dale then showed Robinson to another room; in Robinson’s recollection, ‘Sir Henry said “I don’t think they will appoint you” but offered no further explanation.’ After discussion, Council voted first between the two chemists, Robinson winning by ten votes to Sidgwick’s eight. They then voted between Robinson and Taylor, with Robinson coming out ahead by a single vote, nine to eight. A third vote with just Robinson’s name produced a unanimous result in favour, which was conveyed to the waiting Robinson. A formal letter of invitation followed, which Robinson, apparently no longer worried by the impact on his research time, accepted by return.

Egerton was disappointed, having in the end favoured Taylor—‘a man of great scientific calibre and a charming personality disarming all faction’. But he observed that there had been no chemist as President for 30 years and that Robinson was a ‘greater chemist than NVS, though not such a man of culture’. So he thought it a reasonable outcome, and took comfort from the fact that he would be able to continue working with his friend A. V. Hill.

In later life Robinson described his election in the following possibly disingenuous terms:

The question of [Dale’s] successor was carefully studied at a number of meetings and in the last of these I found I had been nominated myself. ... I have wondered from time to time how this election came to pass. There were several scientific cliques supporting leaders in war service [that is, Tizard] but unfortunately their loyalty was unidirectional [that is, Tizard did not reciprocate]. A process of cancellations [Hill and Tizard withdrawing] allowed me to slip in on grounds of achievements in scientific researches. I had already been awarded the Davy and Royal Medals and in 1942 the Copley Medal. The latter ... has come to be regarded as a qualification for nomination to the Presidency. [Taylor had the Copley, but Sidgwick did not.]

Soon after the decisive Council meeting, Robinson sent an appreciative letter to Tizard: ‘I was genuinely surprised and am overwhelmed of the outcome because I was not well informed about the way events were shaping themselves. I have accepted the nomination ... If elected I shall owe this success chiefly to your support and I shall never forget your large-hearted and generous conduct.’ David Pye, a Council member who had tried to
dissuade Tizard from withdrawing, later acknowledged that Tizard had in fact taken the only course open to him:

I suppose you were right about the PRS affair. Indeed, the line you took was probably the only possible one as things had worked out, but it made me very sad that misdirected zeal should have prevented what I’m certain a large majority would have liked to happen—and which I believe would have occurred if things could have been left to take their normal course.60

THE OUTCOME

Robinson’s election seemed to herald a postwar Society devoted to fundamental research and maintenance of the highest possible standards in fundamental research, and devoted equally to its own independence. That at least provided an answer to the question of whether the Society might be willing to compromise slightly on the scientific stature of its leadership in order to secure greater political adeptness. Robinson was determined to keep the Society out of politics as much as possible, especially at the national level. His term of office was marked by a range of initiatives to restore international scientific relations,61 and a series of Anniversary Addresses that were relentlessly dominated by the latest advances in organic chemistry and rarely dealt with matters of national policy or public affairs. Ironically, one policy issue on which Robinson did fight vigorously as President was the one that Andrade had highlighted, the question of finding new accommodation for the Society; and here his ambitions were thwarted.62 He was still grumpy about it 30 years later.

The story of Andrade’s memorial is a salutary reminder of how a carefully planned initiative can bring about the opposite of its intended effect. He had done his homework, he had kept the ‘prefects’ informed of what was going on, he had got some big names on side. Many Fellows, including many on Council, were sympathetic to his wish to see the Society actively engaged in public life, and there was considerable appetite among the Fellowship for the Society to ‘assume its just place as the voice of British science and exercise that guiding influence on the scientific aspect of our national wellbeing’ that the memorial sought. Yet, from Andrade’s point of view, it all went spectacularly wrong.

By the time he launched his memorial, Andrade had served two years on Council and should have known how things worked. But it became clear that Tizard initially misunderstood his purpose in developing the memorial, which immediately put Andrade in a difficult position. When Tizard did understand it correctly he would have nothing to do with it. Whether or not he actually wanted the Presidency, Tizard knew that open campaigning, even when done by someone else, was not the way to secure high office in the Society, and he would have been horrified at the thought that Fellows might imagine he had been inept enough to instigate the campaign. Although Tizard’s name was eventually excised from the memorial, the damage had already been done because all the signatories, and all those who refused to sign, would have seen it there.

Any selection process is going to involve debate about the relative merits of several individuals. Once a single name had emerged from that process, the Royal Society practice was for Council to have a further vote on that name so that the individual, and the Fellowship at large, could be told that the nomination had the unanimous support of Council. That bolstered the authority of the incoming individual: it was possible when
necessary to gloss over the fact that a significant minority might initially have preferred someone else.\textsuperscript{53} The memorial threatened such courtesies by disrupting the discreet deliberations of Officers and Council. Hence the embarrassment that it occasioned, made all the more acute because Tizard, Hill and Robinson were all on Council at the time.

The disadvantage of such an approach, of course, was that the general Fellowship could easily feel excluded from the decision-making process. Behind both Andrade’s and Soddy’s attempts to petition Council lay the additional motive of chipping away at the oligarchic nature of the Society’s governance. As one of the signatories complained to Andrade:

\begin{quote}
The Council in no sense represents the Fellows, and it is made so difficult for any Fellow to influence the decisions which are taken in the name of the Society as a whole that most Fellows seem to lose the interest which they might be expected to take in the Society’s affairs and activities. Unless the Council can take the first steps in modifying the constitution in such a way as to make itself a Council appointed by the Fellows rather than one acting as though it were divinely ordained, the outlook for the Society is not very bright—even if we have a President who can deal with politicians.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

Once the Officers had done their damage limitation, Andrade’s memorial was at least circulated to Council members, and Henry Dale found himself having to address it explicitly at the 17 May Council meeting. But through gritted teeth. Egerton thought it unfair that the Fellowship as a whole was not informed about the memorial.\textsuperscript{65} Ten years later a group of Fellows was meeting to discuss, again, the problems of the concentration of power in the Officers’ hands, the need for a more effective Council and the difficulty that most Fellows encountered in seeking to influence what the Society did.\textsuperscript{66} It was a persistent theme.

Being a signatory to the memorial was not the prelude to automatic banishment to the outer circle of Society affairs. The memorial and the \textit{Postwar needs} report evoked too much support among the Fellowship to disappear from mainstream thinking within the Society. Both N. V. Sidgwick and E. J. Salisbury signed the memorial—the one touted as a presidential possible just months later, the other selected to succeed A. V. Hill as Biological Secretary. Other signatories included Harrie Massey, who led the Society’s pioneering work on space science during the 1950s; Harry Melville, who was to become Secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in 1956 and subsequently the first Chairman of the Science Research Council; Solly Zuckerman, soon to be deputy chairman of the Advisory Committee on Scientific Policy and subsequently Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government; and Howard Florey. When Florey became President of the Royal Society in December 1960, he set out to pursue the activist agenda for which he had petitioned 15 years previously. And, in an elegant touch, it was he who finally cracked the problem of securing new premises for the Society that matched its ambitions to exercise a guiding influence as the voice of British science.

Tizard stepped down from the Foreign Secretaryship at the end of 1945 but continued as President of Magdalen College, Oxford. In 1948 he re-entered the public spotlight as the inaugural Chairman of both the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy and the Defence Policy Research Committee. A. V. Hill, who had forsworn the Presidency to get back to research and because he hoped Tizard would take it on, did one year as Foreign Secretary before handing that post to Edgar Adrian. But his return to full-time academic work was then delayed a further six months by having to stand in as Physical Secretary while Jack Egerton recovered from a nasty skiing accident. Adrian was Foreign Secretary for four
years and, in 1950, became President. Hill later wrote that, had he stayed with the Foreign Secretaryship for a full five-year term, he might well have become President in 1950 instead of Adrian. He reflected, perhaps a little wistfully, that he was able to do some useful scientific work instead; that Adrian did a good job as President; and that the OM would not compensate for the loss of research time that the Presidency would have entailed.67

As for the well-intentioned but rancorous Percy Andrade, he remained active in Royal Society affairs as Chairman of the Library Committee from 1944 until his death in 1971, Robinson appointing him Honorary Librarian in 1948. He resigned his post as Quain Professor of Physics at University College London to become Director of the Royal Institution Davy–Faraday Laboratory in 1950, the post he had earlier claimed was being earmarked for A. V. Hill. There he was again unsuccessful in initiating institutional reform, and he was forced out within two and a half years. Thereafter he worked as a research consultant. He later remarked ruefully to Harold Hartley, 'I had a very high opinion of Tizard...I tried to get him elected PRS in 1945....the times were exceptional...as it turned out, I merely did myself harm and the Society no good.'68

Reform can be a hazardous business.

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NOTES

1 At that time the President and Foreign Secretary could serve terms of up to five years, subject to annual re-election; the Treasurer and Biological and Physical Secretaries could serve up to ten years.


5 Tizard to Dale, 1 June 1945: HD/6/2/4/6; Dale to Tizard, 5 June 1945: HD/6/2/4/7.

6 Royal Society, The needs of research in fundamental science after the war (printed January 1945; also at Appendix A to CM 14 December 1944). See further CM 4 November 1943, minute 16; CM 30 November 1943, minute 7; CM 13 July 1944, minute 11(b); and CM 12 October 1944, minute 6 and Appendix 1. Fowler died in July 1944, so he did not see the outcome of his initiative. The report became known as the ‘pink paper’, because of the colour of its cover rather than the politics of its authors.


10 The Society’s Charter stipulates a Council of 21 members, of whom 10 must retire each year.


12 Andrade to A. M. Tyndall, 10 January 1945. Uncatalogued Andrade correspondence, Royal Society archives (hereafter Andrade correspondence).

13 Andrade to C. S. Sherrington, 16 January 1945; Andrade to W. E. Curtis, 19 February, Andrade correspondence. The 84 signatories were not a random cross-section: they were Andrade’s friends, contacts and contacts of contacts. Half had been elected to the Society in the previous 10 years, compared with 40% of the Fellowship as a whole; three-quarters were from the physical sciences, compared with just over half for the Fellowship as a whole; and 70% were based in the Oxford/Cambridge/London triangle, compared with, again, a little over half for the Fellowship as a whole. Only two of Andrade’s signatories (E. F. Armstrong and G. M. B. Dobson) had also signed Soddy’s petition in 1935.

14 Andrade to C. S. Sherrington, 14 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.

15 See, for example, Andrade to A. M. Tyndall, 10 January 1945. Andrade correspondence.

16 See, for example, Andrade to C. S. Sherrington, 8 January 1945. Andrade correspondence.


18 Sydney Chapman to Andrade, 15 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.


20 For example, Andrade to S. R. Milner, 19 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.

21 There are copies of various drafts of the memorial in the Royal Society archives, for example at MDA/B/3.4 and 3.5, HF/1/17/1/30 and PB/9/1/101.

22 William Wilson, refusing to sign the memorial, told Andrade that the Society should be able to sort out the housing issue ‘even if its President were in the final stages of senility’. Wilson to Andrade, 10 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.

23 Andrade to Cecil Tilley and Owen Jones, 26 February 1945. Andrade correspondence. J. G. Crowther had been appointed the first Director of the Science Department of the British Council at the outbreak of war and used the position to promote his radical agenda.

24 The memorial originally cited the Nobel Prize, but several Fellows argued that the Society’s own Copley Medal was the preferable benchmark of quality. See, for example, Henry Plummer to Andrade, 12 February 1945: ‘I cannot see why our President should be elected by a Scandinavian body.’ Andrade correspondence.
25 W. V. D. Hodge to Blackett, 26 March 1945, PB/9/1/101; Gilbert Cook to Andrade, 9 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.
26 Andrade to Gilbert Cook, 16 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.
27 This would also release Tizard from what had become a burdensome office: ‘I don’t fill the office well, and am already doing too many things.’ Tizard to Dale, 8 January 1945. HD/6/2/1/56. In the event, however, he served out his full term.
28 Andrade to Tizard, 10 February 1945. Tizard papers, Imperial War Museum, no. 427.
29 Andrade to Sidgwick, 15 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.
30 Sherrington to Andrade, 10 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.
31 Andrade to Chibnall, 5 March 1945. Andrade correspondence. Peters was a member of Council and, like Chibnall, a biochemist. In the event, it was Eric Rideal who succeeded Henry Dale as Director of the Davy–Faraday Research Laboratory at the Royal Institution in 1946; and Andrade succeeded Rideal in 1950. It is not clear whether Andrade had wanted the post for himself in 1945/46.
33 A. V. Hill to Andrade, 23 March 1945. Royal Society Archives, MDA/B/3.4. Copy also at Egerton papers, AE 1/11/11. Egerton and Hill played with the idea of charging Andrade for the postage!
35 Of Henry Dale’s ten immediate predecessors as President, eight had been awarded the Copley Medal before taking office and the remaining two were awarded it after their terms finished. Dale’s successors showed a similar pattern. Dale himself won the Copley Medal in 1937. A. V. Hill to Jack Egerton, 2 February 1945: Egerton papers AE 1/11/11.
36 Background note for the meeting: Egerton papers AE 1/11/11.
37 Another of those present, Felix Fritsch, reported the meeting as focusing on three possible candidates: Tizard, Robinson and Taylor. F. E. Fritsch to C. D. Darlington, 19 March 1945: Darlington papers, Bodleian, ms. Darlington c.95.
38 A. C. G. Egerton diary (AE/2.6), p. 124: 4 March 1945. See also entries for 8, 20, 23 and 26 March 1945.
39 Tizard had successfully nominated Robert Robinson for the Copley Medal in 1942 and, with Egerton, did the same for G. I. Taylor in 1944. CM 16 July 1942, minute 4, and CM 13 July 1944, minute 4.
40 Evan Williams refused to sign the memorial on just the same grounds: the job of the President was to embody the scientific prestige of the Society, and he did this by his research, not his eloquence on public occasions. Williams to Andrade, 6 March 1945. PB/9/1/101.
41 Egerton to Blackett, 13 April 1945. MDA/A/3.1.
42 W. V. D. Hodge to Blackett, 26 March 1945; Blackett to Hodge, 11 April 1945; Blackett notes on the memorial, 11 April 1945. PB/9/1/101.
45 A. V. Hill note for the record headed ‘P.R.S.’: AVHL II 4/68. This was explicitly excluded from his unpublished 1974 three-volume collection of largely autobiographical anecdotes Memories and reflections.
46 Robinson to A. V. Hill, 2 May 1945. AVHL II 4/70.
47 Blackett to Hodge, 11 April 1945 and 7 May 1945. Hodge to Blackett, 27 May 1945. PB/9/1/101. Robinson’s biographer includes Tizard among those he speculates might have been in the running for the Presidency in 1945, and suggests that his prewar work on radar may have counted against him: ‘he had strayed too far from the groves of academe to be acceptable to the Society, which collectively had little sympathy with applied science.’ Trevor I. Williams, Robert Robinson, chemist extraordinary (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), p. 134.
48 David Pye to Tizard, 8 May 1945. Tizard papers, Imperial War Museum, no. 427.
49 Andrade to Tizard, 10 February 1945; Tizard to Dale, undated draft; Dale to Tizard, 15 May 1945. Tizard papers, Imperial War Museum, no. 427.
50 Dale to Tizard, 3 June 1945. Tizard papers, Imperial War Museum, no. 427.
51 Largely because the Officers had to attend a ceremony for admission of new Fellows—including, on this occasion, the admission of Kathleen Lonsdale and Marjory Stephenson, the first women to be elected in the Society’s history. A. C. G. Egerton diary (AE/2.7), p. 69: 17 May 1945.
52 Dale to Hill, 6 June 1945. HD/6/8/7/1.
53 Hill to Tizard, 7 June 1945. Tizard papers, Imperial War Museum, no. 427. Hill was then in his last month as MP for Cambridge University.
54 Hill to Andrade, 10 June 1945. AVHL II 4/3.
55 Hill to Dale, 7 June 1945. HD/6/8/6/5.
57 There were 19 of the 21 members of Council present on 12 July, including Robert Robinson, Tizard and Hill; the two missing were Edward Bailey and Douglas Hartree. With Robinson out of the room, that gives a total of 18 votes. There was one abstention—possibly by the President (who had favoured Tizard but had mostly tried to stay out of the discussions)—on the second vote.
58 A. C. G. Egerton diary (AE/2.7), pp. 182 and 182 bis: 11 and 12 July 1945.
59 Robinson, op. cit. (note 56).
60 Robert Robinson to Tizard, 15 July 1945; David Pye to Tizard, 20 August 1945. Tizard papers, Imperial War Museum, no. 427.
62 For an account of the accommodation issue and its bearing on the Society’s sense of its own identity, see Jeff Hughes’s Presidential Address to the British Society for the History of Science, 2009.
63 Dale commented to Tizard that, partly because such decisions were made ‘decently and in the confidence of Council . . . none of us in the past has known what the Fellows really think about him.’ Dale to Tizard, 3 June 1945. Tizard papers, Imperial War Museum, no. 427.
64 E. C. Stoner to Andrade, 27 February 1945. Andrade correspondence.
66 See, for example, a memo by C. D. Darlington dated 1 January 1955 (probably in error for 1956), which complained of the Society’s failure to promote the interests of science to national benefit and blamed this on ‘the principle of nominated succession in its governing body concealed by the formality of a free election’. This led to discussion with other Fellows in Oxford: Howard Florey and H. H. Plaskett (who both signed Andrade’s 1945 memorial), Ewart Jones and Hans Krebs (neither of whom had been Fellows in 1945) and Francis Simon. Darlington himself had been on Council in 1945. Darlington papers, Bodleian; ms Darlington c.95.
67 A. V. Hill note for the record headed ‘P.R.S.’: AVHL II 4/68; ‘Jack Egerton as Secretary of the Royal Society’, in A. V. Hill, Memories and reflections, ch. 12 (unpublished, 1974). Since the Order of Merit was instituted in 1902, every President of the Royal Society has been made a member. A. V. Hill became a Companion of Honour in 1946 and was awarded the Copley Medal in 1948 to go with his 1922 Nobel prize.